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Likewise it may be well to consider statutory abolition of the distinction between stealing and killing with intent to steal, inasmuch as
the Florida Court has, for all practical purposes, already done so.
W=AM C. McLw_", JR.

LEGISLATIVE NOTES
FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE: WHAT
CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND
WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT?
Florida Statutes §320.59 (1949)
The dog that bites the hand that feeds him has long been looked
upon with distrust. This is nowhere more pointedly illustrated than
in the field of automobile law. To permit a gratuitous rider to demand
from his host the same amount of care that is due a paying passenger
in effect penalizes the operator for his kindness. A majority of the
states have given practical effect to such a sentiment by enacting
laws, familiarly known as guest statutes,1 that confine recovery to
instances of willful and wanton misconduct alone, or to cases involving
either such misconduct or a degree of negligence considerably greater
than that ordinarily regarded as actionable. Statutes of this nature
serve another useful purpose by curtailing the possibilities for collusive action between a driver and his guest in defrauding an
insurer,2 although adirittedly they do not eliminate all collusion.
Tm _s UsED

iN

GUEST STATUTES

With Connecticut pointing the way in 1927, s more than half of
the states have now incorporated an automobile guest statute into
ISee, e.g., Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940); Bailey v.
Neale, 63 Ohio App. 62, 25 N.E.2d 310 (1939); Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, 159
Ore.2 331, 80 P.2d 62 (1938).
Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216, 112 S.W.2d 30 (1937); Taylor v. Taug, 17
Wash.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1948).
sCoNm. tiv. GEN. STAT. §1628 (1930). It is interesting to note that this statute
has since been repealed.
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their laws. In these jurisdictions the guest can no longer recover
for the ordinary negligence of his host,4 although the statutes are by no
means uniform in their wording. The Florida statute, enacted in
1937, provides: 5
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such
transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against
such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner
or operator of such motor vehicle . ... "
This section further requires that the misconduct or gross negligence
be the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss and specifies that
the jury be the sole arbiter of the issues of negligence, gross negligence, misconduct, proximate cause, and assumed risk. It expressly
excludes from its operation ". . . school children or other students
being transported to or from schools or other places of learning in
this state."6
Other state legislatures have used such terms as heedlessness,7
reckless disregard of the rights of others, 8 or willful negligence9 to
define the conduct necessary for recovery. Several states provide
specifically for recovery when the operator is intoxicated at the
time of the accident. 10 The courts of each state find it necessary,
in the light of the particular phraseology of their respective statutes,
to determine the point at which the line should be drawn between
conduct giving rise to recovery by the guest and conduct not action4

See, e.g., Depfer v. Walker, 125 Fla. 189, 169 So. 660 (1935). Some few
states, notably Georgia and Massachusetts, recognize the doctrine of degrees of

negligence and even in absence of a guest statute hold that a guest passenger must
prove more than ordinary negligence.
5
FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1949).
6
0P. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 049-574 (Dec. 3, 1949) carefully calls attention to the
exclusion of both school children and students from the operation of the statute.
tE.g., N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-1001 (1941); Tzx. STAT., REv. Crv. art 6701b
(Vernon 1948).
8
E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 49, §1001 (1947); S. C. CoDE ANN. §5908
(1942).
9

E.g.,

VT. REv. STAT. §10,223 (1947).
OE.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §39-740 (1943); ORE. Comp. LAws Ar.

1

§115-1001

(1939). Florida has no such provision.
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able by virtue of the statute. In this field, as in many others, definitions of terms in the abstract are of little help in themselves, but
when they are studied with regard to their application to specific
facts they offer some leads as to the probable outcome of analogous
situations. For example, Blashfield defines gross negligence as "...
a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than
circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence .. .711 Willful misconduct he describes as "... . the intentional doing of something
which should not be done, or the intentional failure to do something
which should be done ... under circumstances tending to disclose
the operator's knowledge, express or implied, that an injury to the
guest will be a probable result of such conduct."' 2 He later observes
that willful misconduct ". . . differs from negligence, even gross
negligence, although it may include gross negligence, and involves
a distinct positive element as distinguished from the merely negative
element of negligence or carelessness."' 3 These generalizations,
while perhaps the best that can be formulated at this high level of
abstraction, accomplish little by way of indicating the legal outcome
of a specific factual situation.
Can willful and wanton misconduct and gross negligence be
effectively distinguished, or is the boundary -between them so nearly
obliterated as to render them, for all practical purposes, identical?
In any event, is such a distinction necessary, inasmuch as the statute
obviously rules out liability for ordinary negligence? The Florida
Supreme Court considered this distinction extensively in the earlier
cases arising under our guest statute. In 1940 it held that the "or"
4
connecting "gross negligence" and "willful and wanton misconduct"'
is conjunctive, and that these terms are therefore synonymous.15
Some months later, however, it held the "or disjunctive, and concluded that gross negligence can exist without an actual intent to
inflict injury.'6 Finally, realizing the inconsistency of its previous
111 BL.Asmim,

CYcLoEDrA oF AuToMoBaxu

124 BL'smnma, CYCLOPEDLA

Lw, c. 45A, §8 (1927).

or AuToMoBIE LAw AND PAcrics

12322

(penn. ed.).

'Slbid.
14

In common usage the word "willful" has a slightly different meaning from
the word "wanton"; see Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 198, 197 So. 833, 885
(1940). As used in the guest statute, however, the Florida Supreme Court has
always considered them one and the same.
5
0'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817 (1940).
' 6jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940).
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decisions, the Florida Court, in Cormier v. Williams,'7 expressly
overruled two cases18 and held these terms synonymous. From that
time on it has, without exception, adhered to this interpretation.
PossIBLE Thxoaius

OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Although grammarians recognize that "or," when used in the
conjunctive sense, is properly set off by commas, the established
rules of grammar are not always uppermost in the judicial mind in
matters of interpretation. The Court was faced here with the problem
of determining legislative intent. If, however, we assume an intent
to make the two terms synonymous, 9 what did the Legislature hope
to accomplish by what the Supreme Court regards as verbiage?
Three possibilities present themselves: (1) to bring gross negligence
up to the plane of willful and wanton misconduct; (2) to lower willful and wanton misconduct to the level of gross negligence; or (3)
to lump these concepts together with the thought of embracing all
conduct more undesirable than ordinary negligence.
Inasmuch as willful has been held in Florida to signify intentional, 20 a legislative desire to change gross negligence to willful and
wanton misconduct would thereby require some proof of intent
before any person's conduct could fall within the provisions of the
guest statute; and accordingly the plaintiff guest faces a much greater
burden than he does in a jurisdiction interpreting its guest statute
as a carry-over from the doctrine of degrees of negligence. 21 The
opinions in several Florida cases seem to bear this out. 22 Mr. Justice
17148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941).
lSJackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940); Winthrop v.
Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 399 (1940).
19 The California Legislature most certainly regarded the terms as having distinct meanings, because two years after enacting the original guest statute it passed
an amendment eliminating "gross negligence" and leaving only "willful misconduct" as a basis for recovery; see Howard v. Howard, 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P.2d
279 (1933).
20
Wiliams v. State, 92 Fla. 648, 109 So. 805 (1926); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 91
Fla. 427, 107 So. 630 (1926).
21
Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1933). The doctrine
of degrees of negligence is still widely recognized in bailment cases, in which it
originated. Elsewhere, with the exception of automobile guest statutes, it has
gradually been rejected as vague and unwieldy. The three degrees are slight negligence, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence.
22
Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 389, 25 So.2d 870, 876 (1946): "Having held
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Brow'vn obviously thought so when, dissenting in Cormier v. Williams,23
he took the position that while on the facts presented his sympathy
was with the plaintiff, nevertheless judgment should be entered for
defendant in the absence of proof of willful misconduct, inasmuch
of gross neglias the Court had adopted the theory of synonymity
24
misconduet.
wanton
and
gence and willful
Michigan, with an identical statute,23 has similarly interpreted the
terms to be synonymous. It has gone even further by being strictly
logical and has, for example, denied recovery in instances of driving
while intoxicated, 26 speeding on icy pavement 27 lighting a cigarette with both hands while passing a car at fifty-five miles an hour,28
falling asleep a second time while driving,29 and continuing at a
speed of forty-five miles an hour while bending down under the
cowl to adjust the accelerator pedal.3 0 Wyoming, on the other hand,
has held the terms dissimilar; it follows the rules of English grammar
backed by the maxim that the legislature employs each term for a
purpose. 8 '
that the words 'gross negligence' as used in our guest statute, mean the same thing
as 'wilffl and wanton misconduct,' we come to the most vital question in this case.
And that is: Can wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the driver of the
automobile here involved be held to have been proven by the .evidence in this
case? By applying the res ipsa loquitur rule, as above stated, the evidence was
undoubtedly sufficient to prove a prima facie case of simple or ordinary negligence, but the question here is, was it sufficient to prove gross negligence in the
sense of wilful and wanton misconduct?"
See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Buford in Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187,
203, 197 So. 883, 839 (1940): "I am of the opinion that by the enactment of the
statute, supra, the legislature intended to limit the right of recovery by a nonpaying guest to injuries sustained by reason of the wilful and wanton misconduct
of the owner or operator of the automobile in which such guest may receive injuries and I construe the words 'gross negligence' and the words 'wilful and
wanton' as used in the statute to have one and the same meaning. That, as used,
the phrases mean either an actual or a constructive intent to injure." This case was
later overruled; the above dissent is now the law.
23148 Fla. 201, 206, 4 So.2d 525, 527 (1941).
24
See also Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 855, 10 So.2d 565, 568 (1942)
(dissenting opinion).
25

Micr.

CoMP. LAws §4648 (Mason 1929).

20

Findlay v. Davis, 263 Mich. 179, 248 N.W. 588 (1933).
27
Balcer v. Pere Marquette Ry., 266 Mich. 538, 254 N.W. 198 (1934).
28
Olazewski v. Dibrizio, 281 Mich. 423, 275 N.W. 194 (1937).
29
Wismer v. Marx, 289 Mich. 38, 286 N.W. 149 (1939).
3
OBreckenridge v. Arms, 279 Mich. 384, 272 N.W. 716 (1937).
31Wyo. Com. STAT. §60-1201 (1945), Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100
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The Florida opinions follow the Michigan view, but the decisions
themselves belie the general statements made. These decisions lend
support to the argument that willful and wanton misconduct is in
Florida brought down to the level of gross negligence. Indeed, a
number of opinions fail to mention that any sort of intent is necessary for recovery, thereby indicating that a high degree of negligence
is sufficient.3 2 Other cases award damages to the plaintiff on facts
that Michigan would hold insufficient, 33 and yet the opinions stick
to the concept of intent by finding an implied intent as understood
in criminal law.3 4 Under this theory the act complained of must be
of such character that the operator should know that by so acting
in the manner and at the time alleged he places others in almost
certain danger of injury.,3 5 This test also is purely objective; an operator of reckless temperament cannot escape liability by denying realization of the danger involved.
The third theory reaches, in effect, the same result as the second.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, in applying
Florida law, did not bother to define the conduct of the defendant,
and allowed a recovery merely on the basis that the negligence
was certainly greater than ordinary negligence.38 It can be argued
that the only reason the Florida Legislature has enumerated the
various terms is to be all-inclusive in defining conduct more reprehensible than ordinary negligence and for which a recovery will be
allowed.
FLORIDA APPLICATION

OF STATUTE

TO FAcrs

The Florida guest statute specifies ". . . that the question or issue
of negligence, gross negligence, and willful or wanton misconduct...
shall in all such cases be solely for the jury....." This provision, how-

ever, adds nothing to the duties normally assigned to the jury. FurP.2d 102 (1940). This maxim is not unknown to the Florida judiciary; see, e.g.,
State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 385, 39 So. 929, 958 (1905).
32
Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, 38 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1949); Nelson v. McMillan,
151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565 (1942).
33
E.g., driving 60 miles per hour on a bad road is clearly not willful and
wanton misconduct, yet the plaintiff was allowed to recover in McDougald v.
Imler, 153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 418 (1943).
34

E.g., McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942).

35Ibid.
86Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1941).
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thermore, it is not construed so as to prevent the court from passing
on the legal sufficiency of the evidence,3 7 inasmuch as jury verdicts
38
are not immune to authorized judicial review.
In the thirteen years since the passage of the guest statute, less
than twenty-five cases involving it have reached the Florida Supreme
Court. Mere speeding, or speeding combined with some misjudgment, that results in an accident does not impose liability on the
defendant under the statute.39 But speeding on a highway in very
poor repair when the driver should realize the danger involved
constitutes gross negligence and imposes liability upon the driver. 40
The guest can also recover when the speeding driver fails to note
a parked car ahead of him, 4 1 or when he takes up more than his

share of the road while speeding. 42

Conversely, mere misjudgment
44

4
of the space sufficient to pass another car,

even while speeding,

is not sufficient to establish liability. Add, however, a curve in the
highway, and the driver transcends the bounds of ordinary negligence. 43 Causing a collision by zig-zagging across the road, in the
absence of mechanical failure, indicates more than mere momentary
misjudgment; accordingly recovery is allowed. 46 Failure to stop
37

Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941).
Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565 (1942); cf. Middleton,
ludicial Review of Findings of Fact in Florida, 3 U. oF FLA. L. Buy. 281, 283290 (1950).
30
Ayers v. Morgan, 42 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1949); Leslie v. West, 88 So.2d 821
(Fla. 1949); Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 899 (1940); cf. Koger
v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 786, 198 So. 685, 688 1940). The Court here
said that the mere statement that one was travelling at a high rate of speed is
nothing more than the use of a relative term, because the same speed might be
reckless in some circumstances and yet not in others.
4
OMcDougald v. Imler, 153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 418 (1943); of. Shams v.
Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So.2d 715 (1942) (wet highway, smooth tires). It is
interesting to note that, although the plaintiff proved gross negligence as required,
the guest statute was not brought to the attention of the Court.
41
Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417 (1942); Erlichstein v. Roney,
155 Fla. 383, 20 So.2d 254 (1944). The latter case explains that a mere allegation
of gross negligence is not enough. The acts of gross neglect must be stated with
sufficient clarity to enable the court to determine that something more thqn
ordinary negligence is alleged.
42
jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940).
43
Juhasz v. Barton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So.2d 476 (1941).
44
Koger v. Hollaban, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
45
Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1941).
4
GSea Crest Corp. v. Burley, 88 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1949); Cormier v. Willams,
148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941).
38
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at what the driver knows is a stop street, coupled with failure to
47
see a car bearing down on him, renders the driver liable.
An operator who loses control of her automobile when a loud
report sounds from underneath the car at the time she is reaching
into the glove compartment is not liable;48 but if she turns around,
while driving, to adjust some packages in the back seat, and in the
process takes both hands off the steering wheel and brushes her
body against it, she is liable. 49 In this latter case, as the Court
observes, her behavior exceeds momentary inattention, in view of
the well-known dire consequences likely to be produced by an automobile traveling at least thirty-five feet while completely out of
control. Furthermore, there is no unforeseeable factor such as the
unnerving explosion in the former case.
Without direct evidence concerning the cause of the accident,
the Florida Court is not inclined to find gross negligence or willful
and wanton misconduct. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot
be employed to raise a presumption of recklessness under the guest
statute,5 0 inasmuch as any accident can be due to excessive speed,
misjudgment, some momentary lapse of the driver, or other conduct
not sufficient to bring it within the statute. 51
CONCLUSION

Studying the actual wording of the Florida Guest Statute, one
might logically conclude that the Legislature intended to use the
word "or" in the disjunctive. Their conscious use of "and" must
have been meant to tie the word "willful" and the word "wanton"
into one category. Had the Legislature intended that gross negligence should be synonymous with the foregoing terms, would they
not again have used the word "and" rather than "or" to indicate
this similarity? Furthermore, the Court has apparently disregarded
the established rules of grammar in holding that "or," with no commas
setting off the words it governs, is conjunctive rather than disjunc47

Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565 (1942); McMillan v. Nelson,
149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942).
48
Kozak v. Ake, 147 Fla. 508, 3 So.2d 120 (1941).
49
Gittleman v. Dixon, 148 Fla. 583, 4 So.2d 859 (1941).
50
Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946); for a discussion of res ipsa
loquitur see 1 U. oF F.A. L. REv. 470 (1948).
51
Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946); O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141
Fla. 770, 193 So. 817 (1940).
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rive. Nevertheless there is method in this seeming aberration.
The unfortunate experiences encountered in distinguishing between
slight, ordinary, and gross negligence have served as a red flag to
our bench. Realizing the basic feeling of the community as regards
recovery by a guest enjoying the hospitality of his host,52 the Court

has refused to open the door to the opportunity of reducing the
high degree of negligence implicit in the term "gross negligence."
Accordingly it has pegged this standard to willful and wanton misconduct In so doing, however, it has felt the liberalizing pull of
the connotation of gross negligence. The intent implicit in "willful,"
one must remember, is not an intent to injure but rather an intent
to engage in misconduct. In any true accident the driver does not
intend to injure anyone; in the case of willful and wanton misconduct
he simply does not care5 3 The layman calls this driver reckless.
The test is objective. Subjective intent need not be proved, and
as a result conduct considered reckless in the average driver is
sufficient to constitute willful and wanton misconduct. Opinions may,
and do, differ as to certai, instances of undesirable conduct on the
road. There is, however, a certain type of misconduct that all drivers
agree would be indulged in by a fool only. This is the type of
conduct which the statute contemplates.
The judicial disregard of grammar has made no practical difference; the bench has merely foreseen and forestalled the confusion
usually engendered by the vague and therefore virtually useless
term "gross negligence." The revisor who believes that any concept
can be expressed accurately and with finality by merely passing a
statute will suggest amendment with a view to setting forth exactly
what he interprets the Florida decisions to have established. The
real issue, however, is whether the citizens of Florida are satisfied
with the current judicial results in dealing with the guest statute. If
the injured guest should, according to the sentiment of our community, be accorded either greater or lesser opportunities for recovery, then amendment is in order. If not, the practical choice is
to let well enough alone.
STEPEmN H. Gnmds

52For liability to a guest in the home see 4 U. OF FLA.L. REv. 122 (1951).
3
M
Cf. Rm'AT
,E
, To=s §500, 501 (1934).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss1/6

10

